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11. Overview 
Algorithmic systems have been used to inform consequential decisions for at least a century. Recidivism prediction dates back to 
the 1920s (Burgess 1928), (Monachesi 1950), (Trainor 2015). Automated credit scoring dates began in the middle of the last century 
(McCorkell 2002), (Trainor 2015), (Lauer 2017), but the last decade has witnessed an acceleration in the adoption of prediction 
algorithms. 
They are deployed to screen job applicants (Cowgill 2018a), (Cappelli, Tambe, and Yakubovich 2019) for the  recommendation of 
products, people, and content, as well as in medicine (diagnostics and decision aids) (Ustun and Rudin 2017), (“MDCalc - Medical 
Calculators, Equations, Scores, and Guidelines” n.d.), criminal justice (Cowgill 2018b), (Megan Stevenson 2018) (setting bail and 
sentencing), facial recognition (Eubanks 2018), (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018), (Raji and Buolamwini 2019), lending and insurance 
(Jeong 2019), and the allocation of public services (Eubanks 2018), (Abebe and Goldner 2018). 
The prominence of algorithmic methods has led to concerns regarding their systematic unfairness in their treatment of those 
whose behavior they are predicting. These concerns have found their way into the popular imagination through news accounts 
(Dastin 2018) and general interest books (O’Neill 2016), (Broussard 2018), (Noble 2018). Even when these algorithms are deployed 
in domains subject to regulation, it appears that existing regulation is poorly equipped to deal with this issue (Sullivan and 
Schweikart 2019). 
The word ‘fairness’ in this context is a placeholder for three related equity concerns. First, such algorithms may systematically 
discriminate against individuals with a common ethnicity, religion, or gender, irrespective of whether the relevant group enjoys 
legal protections. The second is that these algorithms fail to treat people as individuals. Third, who gets to decide how algorithms 
are designed and deployed. These concerns are present when humans, unaided, make predictions. 
So what is new here? Scale for one. These algorithms are being implemented precisely so as to scale up the number of 
instances a human decision maker can handle. Recruiters, for example, can process thousands of resumes in the blink of an eye. 
As a consequence, errors that once might have been idiosyncratic become systematic. Ubiquity, is also novel — success in one 
context justifies usage in other domains. Credit scores, for example, are used in contexts well beyond what their inventors 
originally imagined. Thirdly, accountability must be considered. Who is responsible for an algorithm’s predictions? How might 
one appeal against an algorithm? How does one ask an algorithm to consider additional information beyond what its designers 
already fixed upon? 
The concern for fairness is often set up in competition with a concern for accuracy. The first is seen as difficult to measure and 
hard to pin down, not least because one is concerned with fairness along a variety of dimensions such as income, health, and 
access to opportunity. Measuring accuracy, on the other hand is seen as unambiguous and objective. Nothing could be farther 
from the truth. Decisions based on predictive models suffer from two kinds of errors that frequently move in opposite directions: 
false positives and false negatives. Further, the probability distribution over the two kinds of errors is not fixed but depends on 
the modeling choices of the designer. As a consequence, two different algorithms with identical false positive rates and false 
negative rates can make mistakes on very different sets of individuals with profound welfare consequences. Prediction also 
depends crucially on the availability of data and data can be compromised in many ways — unevenness of coverage, sample bias, 
and noise. Hence, there are no simple and portable takeaways.
Motivated by these considerations the CCC’s Fairness and Accountability Task Force held a visioning workshop on May 22-23, 
2019, that brought together computer science researchers with backgrounds in algorithmic decision making, machine learning, 
and data science with policy makers, legal experts, economists, and business leaders. The workshop discussed methods to 
ensure economic fairness in a data-driven world. Participants were asked to identify and frame what they thought were the most 
pressing issues and to outline some concrete problems. This document is a synthesis of these comments.
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We begin with four broad remarks that are helpful to frame 
one’s thinking. First is an equity principle for evaluating 
outcomes (see Roemer and Trannoy (2016)). Under this 
principle, outcomes such as educational attainment, health 
status, and employability are assumed to be determined 
by factors that are divided into two categories. The first, 
called circumstances, are factors beyond an individual’s 
control, such as race, height, and social origin. The second, 
called effort variables, are factors for which individuals 
are assumed to be responsible. In practice, it can be 
challenging to distinguish between factors that constitute 
circumstance and factors that constitute effort. Under 
this principle, inequalities due to circumstances holding 
other factors fixed are viewed as unacceptable and 
therefore justify interventions. Inequalities that arise from 
efforts, holding circumstances fixed, may be considered 
acceptable.4 A challenge is that it may not be possible 
to isolate ‘effort’ from circumstance, such as parental 
wealth.5 Even were there a clear distinction between the 
two, circumstances can shape an individual’s incentives 
to exert effort. Further, circumstances and efforts are 
not always observed, and unobserved efforts may be 
correlated with observed circumstances and observed 
efforts may be correlated with unobserved circumstances.
The second is a distinction between two kinds of 
discrimination: taste-based and statistical. To understand 
the difference, imagine a decision has to be made about 
some agent, say whether to give the agent a loan or give her 
a job. The decision maker sees information about the agent, 
including protected demographic information (gender, 
race etc). A decision maker who discriminates against 
an otherwise qualified agent as a matter of taste alone 
is said to exhibit taste-based discrimination. That is, the 
demographics of the agent directly affect the preferences 
of the decision maker (for instance, the decision maker 
finds working with people of a certain gender distasteful). 
In contrast, a decision maker who is unconcerned with 
the agent’s demographics per se, but understands that 
the demographics are correlated with the fitness of the 
agent for the task at hand is said to exhibit statistical 
discrimination. Given imperfect information about the 
agent’s fitness, the decision maker uses the demographic 
information to make statistically better decisions. In 
principle, statistical discrimination may vanish/attenuate 
if better information about the agent’s fitness were 
available. These forms of discrimination are conceptually 
and legally different. Indeed, laws in the US do allow for 
certain forms of statistical discrimination (the burden is 
on the decision maker to prove that decisions made using 
only other information would be statistically worse). The 
distinction is important because understanding the source 
of discrimination informs the possible policy response. It 
is well understood since Becker (1957) that taste-based 
discrimination is attenuated by competition between 
decision makers with heterogeneity in taste. However, 
short of providing better information, policies to reduce 
statistical discrimination are less well understood. 
The third relates to the burgeoning field of fair machine 
learning whose goal is to ensure that decisions guided by 
algorithms are equitable. Over the last several years, myriad 
formal definitions of fairness have been proposed and 
studied by the computer science community (Narayanan 
2018), (Hutchinson and Mitchell 2019), (Mitchell et al. 
2018). One idea calls for similar individuals to be treated 
similarly (Dwork et al. 2012), and requires an appropriate 
measure of similarity. Another idea calls for group-based 
definitions, requiring, for example, that algorithms have 
approximately equal error rates across groups defined 
by protected attributes, like race and gender (Calders and 
Verwer 2010), (Edwards and Storkey 2015), (Hardt et al. 2016), 
(Kamiran, Karim, and Zhang 2012), (Pedreshi, Ruggieri, and 
Turini 2008), (Zafar et al. 2015), (Zemel et al. 2013). However, 
Chouldechova (2017) and Kleinberg et al. (2018) show it is 
typically impossible to satisfy group-based constraints for 
different error measures simultaneously. Corbett-Davies 
et al. (2017) and Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018) further 
argue that group-based definitions have counterintuitive 
statistical properties and, in some cases, can harm the 
4 This principle is not immune to criticism. Some argue that individuals are entitled to benefit from their draw in the genetic lottery (circumstance), see Nozick 
(1974). Others, that equity requires all individuals be guaranteed a minimum level of welfare irrespective of circumstance or effort, see Rawls (1971).
5 Hufe et al. (2017) for example resolves this difficulty by restricting attention to individuals who are very young. In this case, it is hard to argue that effort 
variables will play a significant role.
3groups they were designed to protect. As a result, one 
might take a process-based approach, with decisions 
made by thresholding on an estimate of an individual’s 
risk (e.g., risk of default on a loan, or risk of recidivism), 
in this sense holding all individuals to the same standard. 
But this thresholding approach generally violates formal 
individual- and group-based definitions of fairness. Lastly, 
in those settings where sensitive attributes can be used 
(e.g., in medicine), then preference-based notions of 
fairness and decoupled classifiers have been suggested, 
requiring, for example that one group does not “envy” 
the classifier used for another group (Zafar et al. 2017), 
(Dwork et al. 2018), (Ustun, Liu, and Parkes 2019).  Others 
advocate for adopting a welfare-economics viewpoint 
in interpreting appeals to fairness (Hu and Chen 2019), 
(Mullainathan 2018).
The fourth relates to data biases (Suresh and Guttag 
2019). All statistical algorithms rely on training data, 
which implicitly encode the choices of algorithm 
designers and other decision makers. For example, facial 
recognition algorithms have been found to perform 
worse on dark-skinned individuals, in part because of a 
dearth of representative training data across subgroups 
(Buolamwini and Gebru 2018), (Raji and Buolamwini 2019). 
In other cases, the target of prediction (e.g., future arrest) 
is a poor — and potentially biased — proxy of the underlying 
act (e.g., conducting a crime). Finally, when the training 
data are themselves the product of ongoing algorithmic 
decisions, one can create feedback loops that reinforce 
historical inequities (Kallus and Zhou 2018), (Ensign et al. 
2018), (Lum and Isaac 2016). Mitigating these biases in the 
data is arguably one of the most serious challenges facing 
the design of equitable algorithms.
2. Decision Making and Algorithms
At present, the technical literature focuses on ‘fairness’ at 
the algorithmic level. The algorithm’s output, however, is 
but one among many inputs to a human decision maker. 
Therefore, unless the decision maker strictly follows 
the recommendation of the algorithm, any fairness 
requirements satisfied by the algorithm’s output need 
not be satisfied by the actual decisions. Green and Chen 
(2019), for example, report on an mTurk study that shows 
participants were more likely to deviate upward from 
algorithmic risk assessments for black defendants. M. 
Stevenson and Doleac (2019) discuss the introduction of 
risk assessment in sentencing in Virginia, and document 
that only a subset of judges appeared to integrate 
algorithmic risk assessment in their decisions.
Even if an algorithm’s output violates some measure of 
fairness, it need not follow that the final outcomes are worse 
than the status quo of decision making sans algorithmic 
support. Cowgill (2018a), for example, documents an instance 
where the introduction of algorithmic resume screening 
reduced discrimination against non-traditional candidates. 
Kleinberg et al. (2018) describe a policy simulation that 
suggests that risk assessments in conjunction with human 
decision making would lower racial disparities relative to 
judges deciding alone.  
The discussion above suggests the following questions:
a)  How do human decision makers interpret and integrate 
the output of algorithms?
b)  When they deviate from the algorithmic recommendation 
is it in a systematic way?
c)  What is the role of institutional incentives for decision 
makers?
d)  What can one say about the design of an algorithm that 
results in fair (fairer?) decisions by the human, which 
complements human decision making?
e)  What aspects of a decision process should be handled 
by an algorithm and what by a human to achieve 
desired outcomes? 
f)  The “insufficiently diverse research team” hypothesis, 
is often cited as a reason for unfair machine learning 
algorithms.6 Yet, we have no systematic documentation 
of the effects of biased programmers or the effects 
of diverse AI workforce on the outputs created by 
practitioners (Whittaker et al. 2018).
3. Assessing Outcomes
The outcome of an intervention can differ from its predicted 
effect because of the existence of indirect effects or 
feedback loops; for example, see predictive policing (Lum 
and Isaac 2016), (Ensign et al. 2018), as well as bail (Cowgill 
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2018b) recommendation. Hence, in addition to good-faith 
guardrails based on expected effects, one should also 
monitor and evaluate outcomes. Thus, providing ex ante 
predictions is no less important than ex post evaluations 
for situations with feedback loops. 
At present, there is a paucity of work that seeks to quantify 
the effect on outcomes across the many domains where 
we will see automated decision making.7 Measuring the 
effect of an algorithm on an outcome is inherently difficult 
because decisions made (or influenced) by an algorithm 
may have happened identically in the absence of the 
algorithm. Randomized controlled trials would be a natural 
way to assess such effects, but randomization may be 
repugnant in some applications of interest and requires 
smart experimental design.8  Short of randomized controlled 
trials, the regression discontinuity method (“RD” (D. S. Lee 
and Lemieux 2010)) is a useful tool for measuring causal 
impact. Many machine learning applications make use of a 
continuous prediction (or score) with a decision threshold 
for an intervention, and the RD method estimates causal 
effects by looking at examples slightly below and above 
this threshold (assuming they are otherwise essentially 
identical). Papers that have used RD to study the causal 
impact of algorithms include Cowgill (2018b), Berk (2017), 
Anderson et al. (2013), and M. Stevenson and Doleac (2019).
Another challenge is that the environments in which 
algorithm-assisted decision making are deployed are 
always in flux. Consider hiring — today a firm may value 
individuals with analytical skills but tomorrow people 
skills may become the priority. Automated tools for hiring 
may also lead to defining a more and more narrow set 
of characteristics to allow it to consider a larger set of 
candidates. See, for example, the advice given to job 
seekers here: https://www.jobscan.co/blog/top-resume-
keywords-boost-resume/.
Metrics to measure the extent of discrimination sometimes 
play an important role in regulatory guidelines but are 
challenging to develop and tend to be narrow in scope 
with effects that are hard to anticipate. A first example 
is the “four-fifths rule” of EEOC guidelines, which states 
that if the selection rate for a protected group is less than 
four-fifths of that for the group with the highest rate then 
this constitutes evidence of adverse impact.9 A second 
example is the use of a single metric to measure the 
performance of a system. Such a metric can easily miss 
inequality that arises through complex effects (Crenshaw 
1989), (Grusky and Ku 2008), (Grusky and Ku 2008). The 
domains in which algorithms are deployed are highly 
complex and dynamic, and data can pick up intersectional 
and multi-dimensional sources of discrimination (Abebe, 
Kleinberg, and Weinberg 2019).
Strategic considerations also play a role. For any proposed 
metric, one needs to identify the affected parties and their 
possible responses.10 Therefore, policies cannot be judged 
ceteris paribus. Some existing research has shown that 
changing the incentive structure of those implementing 
or using algorithmic recommendations can in itself also 
be a tool for change (see Kannan et al. (2017) for example). 
Theoretical research, particularly “impossibility theorems” 
(Chouldechova 2017), (Kleinberg et al. 2018), reveal that 
multiple attractive fairness properties are impossible 
to achieve simultaneously. Hence, it is inevitable that 
someone’s notion of fairness will be violated and that 
tradeoffs need to be made about what to prioritize. These 
6 The implicit suggestion of the work of Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) on biases in facial recognition technology (FRT) is that were there more programmers 
with dark skin this wouldn’t have happened. 
7 Some exceptions include work on discrimination and bias in the context of facial recognition technology (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018), online ads (Sweeney 
2013), word-embeddings (Bolukbasi et al. 2016), search engines (Noble 2018) and health information (Abebe et al. 2019).
8 In credit scoring, for example, Kilbertus et al. (2019) suggest approving everyone with a high enough score, and randomly approving applicants with an 
insufficient score.
9 This can be applied to any decisions related to employees — including hiring, promotion, and training.
10 For instance, there is a literature (Coate and Loury 1993) in economics on what role a community’s belief that they will be treated fairly (such as in education 
or access or the job market) affects their incentives to invest in human capital.
5results do not negate the need for improved algorithms. 
On the contrary, they underscore the need for informed 
discussion about fairness criteria and algorithmic 
approaches that are tailored to a given domain. Also, we 
must recognize that these impossibility results are not 
about algorithms, per se. Rather, they describe a feature 
of any decision process, including one that is executed 
entirely by humans.
The discussion above suggests the following questions:
a)  How do existing standards (e.g., disparate impact 
standards for hiring or housing) affect participation 
decisions and other quantities that are not directly 
scrutinized?
b)  In regard to endogenous algorithm bias (Cowgill 2018a), 
can we identify the interventions that could change or 
reduce it?
c)  Can we usefully model the feedback loop when designing 
metrics, and can we understand when a deployed 
system will still be able to be used for inference on 
cause and effect? 
d)  How can we design automated systems that will do 
appropriate exploration in order to provide robust 
performance in changing environments?  
e)  Can we understand the common issues that prevent 
the adoption of algorithmic decision-making systems 
across domains and the common issues that produce 
harm across multiple domains?
4. Regulation and Monitoring
Prohibitions against discrimination in lending, housing, 
and hiring are codified in law but do not provide the 
precise way in which compliance will be monitored. Poorly 
designed regulations have costly consequences in terms 
of compliance costs for firms, as well as generate harm 
to individuals. 
Some have argued for “output’’ regulation. The “four-fifths 
rule”, mentioned above, is an example. Others favor “input’’ 
regulation because they are more easily monitored than 
outputs.  
Another challenge is that the disruption of traditional 
organizational forms by platforms (e.g., taxis, hotels, 
headhunting firms) has dispersed decision making. Who is 
responsible for ensuring compliance on these platforms, 
and how can this be achieved? On the one hand, platforms 
may be immune to existing regulation. For example, 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 
protects online software platforms from the actions of its 
users. At the same time, litigation and investigations have 
yielded penalties and changes (Levy n.d.). Platforms may 
also enable visibility into (and oversight of) discrimination 
that was previously difficult to observe.
Platforms lower the transaction costs of search and 
matching. Some, such as Lyft, make the match. Others, 
such as AirBnB, assist in search by curating and organizing 
the relevant information and making recommendations. 
Ostensibly innocuous, such recommendation and rating 
systems can have huge impacts. One area of concern, 
for example, is whether these kinds of systems can lead 
to the consumption of less diverse content. Although the 
effect of recommender systems on diversity is debated 
(Nguyen et al. 2014), (Fleder and Hosanagar 2009), (Möller 
et al. 2018), this would then mean algorithms having a role 
in creating filter bubbles, which have in turn been argued 
to exacerbate polarization.11 All this raises a number of 
questions. What does informed consent mean?  Who gets 
to decide what an individual sees? 
Effective regulation requires the ability to observe the 
behavior of algorithmic systems, including decentralized 
systems involving algorithms and people. To see the 
entire machine learning pipeline facilitates evaluation, 
improvement (including “de-biasing”), and auditing. On the 
other hand, this kind of transparency can conflict with 
11 Although there is evidence that the connection between the internet and social media and polarization is weak, see Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017).
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privacy considerations, hinder innovation, and otherwise 
change behavior. 
The discussion above suggests the following questions:
a)  When is output regulation preferable to input regulation 
and vice-versa? 
b)  Does the regulation of algorithms result in firms 
abandoning algorithms in favor of less inspectable 
forms of decision-making?
c)  If regulating inputs, which portion of the machine 
learning pipeline should be regulated? 
d)  How should platforms design the information and 
choices they offer their users to reduce discrimination? 
(Agan and Starr 2018) 
e)  How should recommenders or similar systems be 
designed to provide users with more control? (e.g. 
Ekstrand and Willemsen (2016), Yang et al. (2019)).
5. Educational and Workforce 
Implications
Is the human capital necessary to think carefully about 
fairness considerations as they relate to algorithmic 
systems in abundance? What should judges know 
about machine learning and statistics? What should 
software engineers learn about ethical implications of 
their technologies in various applications? There are 
also implications for the interdisciplinarity of experts 
needed to guide this issue (e.g., in setting a research 
agenda). What is the relationship between domain and 
technical expertise in thinking about these issues? 
How should domain expertise and technical expertise 
be organized: within the same person or across several 
different experts? How do we train computer scientists 
to understand and engage with broader contexts, and 
to communicate and engage with relevant experts to 
broaden this understanding? The prior literature on these 
questions related to training and ensuring a well-equipped 
workforce includes Deming and Noray (2018) on STEM 
careers and technological change, and Oostendorp (2019) 
and Colson (2019) in regard to data science training.
Looking forward, it seems important to understand 
the effect of different kinds of training on how well 
people will interact with AI based decisions, as well as 
understand the management and governance structure 
for AI decisions. Are managers (or judges) who have some 
technical training more likely to use machine learning-
based recommendations? Are they more or less likely to 
benefit from machine learning-based recommendations? 
In regard to governance, what is the appeals process and 
is there a role for ‘AI councils’? As our curriculum changes, 
we should also seek to understand whether explicitly 
embedding ethics training for computer science students 
influences bias-related outcomes. What about labor 
outcomes? For example, does domain expertise help in 
data science careers or vice versa?  
6. Algorithm Research 
Algorithm design is a huge, well-established community 
in computer science, with lots of great problem-solvers 
who would love to work on impactful problems. At the 
same time, fairness questions are inherently complex and 
multifaceted and incredibly important to get right. 
Today, it is reasonable to posit that a lot of work is 
happening around the various concrete definitions that 
have been proposed — even though practitioners may find 
some or even much of this theoretical algorithmic work 
misguided.
Given that it is hard to understand the intent behind 
different formalisms, a challenge that this presents to 
algorithm designers is that it makes it difficult to identify 
the most promising, technical algorithmic problems on 
which to work. This raises the question of how to promote 
cross-field conversations so that researchers with both 
domain (moral philosophy, economics, sociology, legal 
scholarship) and some technical expertise can help others 
to find the right way to think about different properties, 
and even identify if there are still dozens of properties 
whose desirability is not unanimously agreed upon.
Suppose an algorithms researcher comes up with a new 
algorithm and proves that it achieves a technical property, 
say that it equalizes false-positives. What sanity checks 
should be executed to see if this is for a silly reason? To 
draw an analogue: in the context of algorithmic game 
theory, it wouldn’t be interesting to design a protocol 
where honest behavior is a Nash equilibrium just because 
7behavior doesn’t affect payoff in any way. Might it be 
possible to develop a sense of what is necessary for a 
result to be interesting in the context of fairness and 
economics? Can we see a path towards a community 
of algorithm designers who also have enough domain 
expertise that they are capable of identifying promising 
new technical directions, and work that will be appreciated 
by domain experts?
7. Broader Considerations 
Some discussion amongst participants went to concerns 
about academic credit and how the status quo may guide 
away from applied work, noting also that the context 
of more applied work can be helpful in attracting  more 
diverse students into computer science (Whittaker et 
al. 2018).12 Others asked how one might promote more 
engagement with social science and researchers with 
domain expertise as well as policy-makers.13 There 
are also difficult ethical challenges with conducting 
empirical, data-driven research, as considered within 
the NSF supported PERVADE (Pervasive Data Ethics for 
Computational Research) project.14 
A thread that ran through all the discussions at the 
meeting was a sense that the research community may 
‘narrow frame’ the issues under consideration. This is the 
tendency to define the choices under review too narrowly. 
For example, the problem of selecting from applicants 
those most qualified to perform a certain function is not 
the same as guaranteeing that the applicant pool includes 
those who might otherwise be too disadvantaged to 
compete.  
The focus on prediction also leads to narrow framing. 
Predicting the likelihood of showing up for a bail hearing 
is not the same as understanding the reasons why an 
individual may be a no-show. The focus on one as opposed 
to the other leads to different interventions that could 
have dramatically different impacts. Prediction in this 
context, generally leads to the question of whether the 
individual should be released or not. Understanding the 
reasons behind a no-show may suggest interventions 
that lower the barriers to individuals to showing up. 
12 There is also a role for organizations such as Black in AI in fostering the involvement of individuals from under-represented groups and advocating  for 
taking a multi-disciplinary perspective in AI fairness.
13 Some early examples are the FAT* conference (an explicit call for interdisciplinarity) and the many interdisciplinary, but non-archival workshops, such as the 
MD4SG workshop, which provides space for “problem pitches” as well as more traditional formats.
14 This project is working on metrics for assessing and moderating risks to data subjects, discovering how existing ethical codes can be adapted and adopted, 
and disseminating evidence-based best practices for research ethics.
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